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Abstract: Transmission of human experience is essential for many purposes. It has 
two aspects: content and social relation. Digital technologies can solve some of the classic 
issues in capture and transmission of human experience.  
Based on these new technical affordances, this article presents a framework to 
capture and describe human activity and experience based on video and cooperative 
explicitation of activity trajectories with the subject, using a transition model inspired from the 
formalism of dynamical systems. The article also introduces this special issue “Digitize and 
Transfer”, and gives an overview of its papers. 
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Résumé. La transmission de l’expérience humaine est un enjeu fondamental pour l’espèce. Elle a deux 
aspects: le contenu et la relation sociale. Les technologies numériques peuvent résoudre certains des 
problèmes classiques de la capture et la transmission de l’expérience humaine.  
En s’appuyant sur ces nouvelles possibilités techniques, ce document présente un nouveau 
cadre pour capturer et décrire l’activité humaine et l’expérience. On utilise la vidéo et un entretien 
d’explicitation des trajectoires d’activité avec les sujets, en faisant appel au modèle des « transitions » 
inspiré du formalisme des systèmes dynamiques. 
Ce document introduit également ce numéro spécial “Numérisation et transfert”, et donne un 
aperçu critique des articles qui le composent.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Sharing individual experience is at the basis of culture, and also of group belonging. We all 
learn from other people’s experience. This is a characteristic we share with other social 
animals: for example rats will observe their conspecifics and choose or avoid the same foods 
(Strupp & Levitsky, 1984). This way of learning through the transmission of other’s 
experience of course has adaptive value (in this case, avoiding poisonous foods). In fact 
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social animals have developed empathic competences, which enable them, to some degree, 
to make sense of the overt behaviour of conspecifics in terms of their own experience. 
Humans are capable of empathy (see (Hatfield, Rapson & Le,  2009) for a review); and, on 
the other hand, Homo sapiens has developed sophisticated innate signalling systems to 
express these emotions to conspecifics (Darwin, 1872), which all humans can decode (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1967). Recent research suggests that humans and some other primates have 
inbuilt cognitive systems (‘mirror neurones’) which enable them to feel the movements of 
other primates whom they see acting and to automatically infer the intentions behind these 
movements (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; 
Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). These capacities facilitate learning in presence and by imitation. 
They are powerful, but are somewhat limited by the fact those who share experience must be 
co-present during the event.  
It must be noted here that this sharing of experience is crucial in the constitution of 
groups. In the short term, sharing experience (and especially emotions) is a strong 
constituent of participation. In the long term, what builds a community is the sharing of 
experience; and believing that this sharing is for the long term (hence the creation of a 
common mythical past and belief in a common destiny or project). Rituals are typically 
moments where this phenomenon of participation is strong and can guide our intuition as to 
what kind of ‘sharing’ feeling humans enjoy. In sum, transmission of experience has a social 
dimension that goes beyond the mere transmission of information --- we shall come back to 
this later in the section with the notion of obschenie. 
However, Homo Sapiens has gone one step further and developed a symbolic 
system of representations which, precisely, goes beyond this limitation of physical presence. 
Language, and more generally representation (re-presentation), enabled humans to transmit 
some of the experience of objects, situations, intentions, etc., and the potential actions they 
carry beyond the ‘here and now’ in the physical absence of the object. For example, the 
person who has been in contact with ‘a tiger’ can describe, explain, teach what ‘a tiger’ is, 
and what should be done when one is met; all this in the comfortable absence of a tiger.  
This has a cost: representations are a projection of the original phenomenological 
experience of the individual into a conventional, social, typifying, symbolic system; which is 
why we use here the term ‘experience’ and not ‘knowledge’ or ‘information’. The latter terms 
refer to culturally processed products, which have gained in social intelligibility but have lost 
some of the multidimensional aspects of primary, direct, bodily experience. 
Representations are pervasive in our lives because our societies hold, construct, and 
are continuously reconstructed by these representations (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; 
Moscovici, 1976). Representation systems carry their own affordances, which may open new 
cognitive possibilities, as (Goody, 1977) showed for writing and Wells (in preparation) shows 
for literacy. But representations also carry biases: for example, the structure and vocabulary 
of a language may influence the way people experience the world (Whorf & Carroll, 1956).  
Therefore, changes in our capacity to represent and transfer human experience will have 
deep and pervasive consequences at the societal level. 
Precisely, digitization has suddenly and massively increased our capacity to 
represent and transfer human experience by empowering us to represent new aspects which 
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were difficult to represent before (e.g. movements, space) and to provide new perspectives 
(e.g. bird’s eye, first person, slow motion, acceleration, high magnification etc.); as well as by 
greatly increasing the scope and speed of diffusion of such representations (through the 
Internet, etc.) while decreasing the marginal cost of such diffusion to almost zero. 
In addition, digitization, because of the pervasiveness of networks and of the user-
friendly interfaces to the networks, now enables interactivity. Representations are 
continuously updated, amended, discussed, referred to in a collective-authorship process for 
which new instruments are growing: digital fora, wikis (Wikipedia being the most spectacular 
example), social media, etc. Academia and professional training are now starting to put into 
practice these new tools, as was predicted; but the evolution is slow because these 
institutions must change models that took centuries to construct with the previous 
techniques. 
It is obvious that this change of representation systems will (and already has begun 
to) massively change our societies, as the printing press did in its time. It may be interesting 
therefore to search for the fundamental drives that are at stake and which will orient the 
evolution of a technology that could virtually, in this domain, do anything. We forward here 
the hypothesis that, because humans are social beings, we wish to share experience more 
than we want to transmit knowledge. 
This statement refers us back to two aspects of communication: content and sharing. 
The distinction is not new: these aspects are explicitly separated in the Russian theory of 
communication: kommunikatsiya, which refers to the informational content --- content in the 
western tradition (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) --- and obschenie, which refers to the social, 
sharing aspects(Lomov, Belyaeva, et al.1985; Lomov, 1978, 1979; Nosulenko & Samoylenko 
1997). 
Indeed, this concept characterizes a specific area and sophisticated research in the Russian 
psychology. The term ‘obschenie’ incorporates several meanings of the term ‘communication’ as, for 
example, ‘Human Relations’, ‘interaction between individuals’, ‘pooling’ and finally ‘sharing’ in the 
spiritual sense …. In this perspective, communication is increasingly seen as not only a way to 
‘convey information’, but also as social interaction and as a means of investigating the psychological 
characteristics of the other. (Nosulenko & Samoylenko 1998: 5)  
 
Social aspects of communication, and the role of experience sharing in group participation 
mentioned earlier are obvious in the way Internet chat and other ‘social’ media (Facebook, etc.) are 
used. Although there is a lot of information transmission, a large amount of the direct 
‘communication’ is made of ‘phatic’ statements (Malinowski, 1923) and of sharing moods with 
various devices or emoticons. In social media, the main goals of obschenie statements seem to be to 
signal that the individual is there, as a member of the group, and willing to share her/his experience (‘I 
am doing this’; ‘I just did that’; ‘I am willing to display my experience’). In fact, even mobile-phone 
conversations often start with some statement of where the speakers are, which is usually irrelevant to 
the kommunikatsiya aspect of the conversation, but crucial for sharing experience.  
As we provide humans with very open affordances for communication, their actual behaviour 
and choices among all the possible combinations reveal to us what is really important for them: 
attending to the group; and this grounds our hypothesis. In digital mediated communication, as in real 
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life, the relation seems to be more important than the content. This does not mean that there is no 
kommunikatsiya in the social media, but it usually comes with obschenie. Furthermore, this is 
precisely the reason for the success of the social media and their future business model as 
(social) sources of (commercial) information. Humans prefer to learn with someone rather 
than from some document, as has been made clear by the success of training by peers over 
using manuals in information technology. In fact, the preferred information is the one that 
comes from –and with- a ‘good’ group or source. 
The interplay of kommunikatsiya and obschenie is complex because, more often than 
not, being a good information provider (providing snappy answers in fora, having the good 
Web links first) is a strategy to gain social status: in the end, the social motive takes over and 
instruments all others. Here we see applied in the Web a theory that was worked out by 
Dessalles for the development of conversation and the origin of language: displaying skills in 
managing information and transmitting experience to others is valued as a positive selective 
trait for the skilful individual, since it signals him (her) as a good coalition partner (Dessalles, 
2007). 
Digital technologies are better at affording obschenie than conventional symbolic 
communication techniques because of their quick reaction time and interactivity, and this 
feeds their growth. It is likely they will be used in the future for other aspects of experience 
sharing, to transfer more and more multimodal, intimate aspects of individual experience; 
and to build communities, at the same time as they grow as communication systems in the 
sense of kommunikatsiya. 
In this context, this article will first introduce this special issue with a quick overview of 
the papers, and how they fit in the problematic of the impact of digital technologies on the 
transmission of knowledge; and then suggest a model for transferring human experiencen 
using the affordances of these information technologies. 
Section 2 introduces the papers in this issue. Section 3 addresses the difficulties in 
the transmission of human experience, due to its nature. Section 4 shows how digital 
technologies enable us to resolve some of these issues, but reminds us that these new 
solutions also raise new issues. Section 5 proposes a new ‘transition’ model to structure the 
capture and description of human experience using the affordances of these information 
technologies. 
 
2 Digitize and transfer 
 
This issue of the Journal is taking a closer, grounded, look at how the process of capture and 
transmission of human experience and knowledge will change with the advent of new digital 
media. 
The core functional question of culture from an evolutionary perspective is: How can 
the species foster the outcome of experiencing the world so that the next generation behaves 
more efficiently? Trial and error was the biological way of natural selection: the fittest 
survived and reproduced (Darwin, 1859). Culture uses a dual selection process, where 
artefacts are selected by trial-and-error reality test (in society, on the market, etc.), while their 
representations are selected by thought experiments and discussions, under institutional 
5 
monitoring and control (Lahlou, 2008a). Now, with the diffusion of digital technologies, 
institutions have started indeed reflecting on how to put to use these new affordances; they 
have begun their social-monitoring process of these technologies. 
Science is exploring what these new media make it possible to transfer: see in this 
issue (Barabanschikov 2010), on the transmission of digitized faces, and Cordelois 
(Cordelois, 2010) on new ethnographic techniques. It also creates and tests new media, like 
Mobltz, to make the best of the new affordances and create new types of multimedia 
narratives (Lewis, Pea & Rosen, 2010). Smaller institutions concerned with production 
develop new solutions to capture and transfer their cognitive capital. Industrial corporations 
are interested in the transmission of professional know-how ( Le Bellu, Lahlou & Nosulenko, 
2010); while research centres and academia are trying to archive research data and results 
(Habert & Huc, 2010). Will new forms of narratives succeed in fulfilling the function that 
stories have always had in society (Garcia-Lorenzo, 2010)? The effect will certainly be 
global, but, at this point, it is unclear whether the result will be a liberation or a nightmare --- 
maybe both --- since, as Ganascia points out, we can already see massive positive and 
negative effects of what is clearly a change of societal paradigm caused by the digital 
projection (Lahlou, 2008a) of all elements of the ‘classic’ world into its continuously updated 
digital representation.  
 
2.1 Framing uncertainty: Narratives, change and digital technologies. 
 
Lucia Garcia-Lorenzo traces a broad cultural analysis of narratives, from developmental 
aspects to organizational studies. While the roles of narratives in the transmission of 
knowledge has always been recognized, their role as instruments of community building, 
ensuring permanence of the group, and of reassurance of its members in the face of 
uncertainty is less often described. Illustrations are taken from three empirical case studies in 
the corporate world by Garcia-Lorenzo (the take-over of a national company by a 
multinational corporation; a British-Swedish merger; and a virtual project team whose 
members are distributed around the globe).  
Reading Garcia-Lorenzo, it becomes clear that narratives are social-psychological 
processes, of which the manifest content (the story) is only one part, the activity of 
storytelling being a crucial aspect. In moments of uncertainty, when the organization must 
find psychological and social resources to face change, (re)creating and telling narratives 
provides group members with resources to manage emotions constructively, link with the 
past and provide a framework for self-development. Garcia-Lorenzo shows with empirical 
illustrations how people create narratives to make sense of their world and especially by 
making boundaries.  
She also shows that the relation of storytelling with digitization is complex. On one 
hand, traditional storytelling is challenged, and new technologies produce a fragmentation 
and plurivocity in the organization. On the other hand, these technologies provide 
affordances for a new networking culture and new forms of circulation of stories. 
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2.2 Beyond participation to co-creation of meaning: mobile social media in generative learning 
communities 
 
Sarah Lewis, Roy Pea and Joseph Rosen describe a new system for sharing experience 
between individuals, with Mobltz, an amazing hybrid of blogs, social networks and video-
streaming. Beyond the technological revolution of enabling seamless mixes of text and video, 
Mobltz is remarkable in its interface target: the mobile phone. This goes hand in hand with 
the growing trend of being ‘always on’ and closely connected to the digital network by 
reporting actions and thoughts, and contributing to a collective construction online and on the 
fly. This system gives a preview of a future society where communication of experience with 
fellow humans is continuous and mediated by the Internet in a multimodal format that 
encompasses all senses. The authors’ ambitious reflexion, grounded in activity theory, on 
new modes of online presence and discussion sheds new light on the social-media hype. 
The public sphere described by Habermas, at a time where language was the main vehicle 
for discussion and when publication was a long and usually reflexive process, is now 
becoming a multimedia arena where anyone can contribute at anytime with very low entry 
barriers.  
 
2.3 Capture and transfer the knowledge embodied in a professional gesture 
 
Sophie Le Bellu, Saadi Lahlou and Valery Nosulenko present a systematic attempt to 
capture and model professional gestures (here, in the context of operating machines in 
power plants), to transfer them from expert to novice. While they use the Subcam, as well as 
more-classic recording equipment, it soon becomes clear that cooperation with the 
professionals who are filmed is a critical aspect of their technique, in order to capture the 
goals and sub-goals as well as the local decision-making process. Their article, which 
presents the state of the art, while giving a clear and exciting vision of what is obviously the 
future of professional training, shows that we are far from having solved all the theoretical 
and technical difficulties of ‘how to get there at low cost’. It also points to a rising new 
paradigm of collaborative construction of knowledge, where the distinction between author, 
subject, critic and user gets blurred. Indeed the construction, maintenance and use process 
of the new information tools seem to involve inputs from all the stake-holders in continuous 
work in progress, in sharp contrast to the former ‘book-publication’ mode. 
 
2.4 Using digital technology for collective ethnographic observation: an experiment on ‘coming 
home’ 
 
Antoine Cordelois describes a collective process where individuals are empowered to 
collectively reflect on the action of one of them, by sharing the subjective view of his actions 
as recorded by the Subcam. While this is a first attempt, and is only used at this point for 
research purposes, one can think that such a process may generalize to other collective 
situations: learning, training, but perhaps also trials, entertainment, decision-making support, 
etc. While we usually tend to consider each technological innovation separately to evaluate 
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its impacts, Cordelois’ article provides food for thought by showing how the combination of 
two techniques (here: the subjective-recording with a Subcam, and collaborative online 
editing with Diver) can generate ground-breaking innovations in a classic process (here, the 
ethnographic analysis).  
 
2.5 What does the transmitted image of human face tell an observer about personality traits 
 
Using the experimental techniques of psychology, Vladimir Barabanschikov studies what 
subjects are able to infer from the psychological traits of other humans by looking at their 
photo. Are the judgments based on photos correct? To ascertain this, he uses Cattel’s scale 
of 16 personality factors (e.g. emotionality, reliability, self-reliance, etc.), and compares these 
assessments with the direct assessments of the photographed persons themselves 
(approximately 40% of the traits are estimated correctly; there are some differences in the 
results based on gender, and also on the viewer’s own personality). On that basis, which 
gives us an idea of the interpretation capacities of humans, we can now evaluate the impact 
of partial transmission.  
When the face is partially masked, there is little difference in accuracy when the left- 
or right-hand sides of the face are showed alone; but when only the top part is showed, there 
is a marked decrease, and even more if only the lower part is shown. What this means for 
the issue of digitization is that (a) what is perceived from an image is different from what the 
person thinks of herself and also probably different from ‘reality’; (b) the capacity to transmit 
accurate information about the other’s personality depends on the integrity of the medium. 
Although this may seem a ‘half-full-glass’ result, it does suggest that transmitting better 
images will produce better understanding of the Other. 
 
2.6 Building together digital archives for research in social sciences and humanities 
 
Benoît Habert and Claude Huc describe a recent institutional attempt, by the French national 
research agency, to create a digital archive of a scientific domain. In this case, spoken data 
(which ‘mainly consist in dialogs or monologs recorded for linguistics research’) were used as 
a pilot domain. In contrast with Garcia-Lorenzo’s paper on narratives, this project, inspired by 
similar initiatives in physics, shows a computer-science approach to the issue of 
transmission. The project explored how systematic digital conservation could be applied to 
the field of social sciences and humanities, using a standard abstract model for archival 
information systems. 
This article, which includes reflection on the nature of archiving and patrimonial 
strategies, is especially valuable because it provides an insider view, having been written by 
two main leaders of the project --- it is exceptional that project leaders make the effort to 
reflect on their practice as builders of a new socio-technical system. The analysis shows how 
institutional and technical logics can influence process, and the importance of administration 
and project management, as attested by the number of acronyms representing institutions 
and systems involved. This contribution is interesting as an example of a deep reflexive 
exercise by the engineers of the new institutional digital system. It gives food for thought on 
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how to organize in the future such large conservation projects and how to involve the 
relevant communities. 
 
2.7 The generalized ‘sousveillance’ society  
 
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia addresses one major consequence of the generalized transmission 
of experience through digital means, which he describes as the birth of a ‘Catopticon’, which 
makes everybody capable of communicating with everybody. This new situation, introduced 
by the internet and the generalization of both surveillance and ‘sousveillance’ (where the 
citizens themselves observe the system) by electronic means, contrasts with the previous 
situation and the model of the Panopticon (where one powerful watchman could watch all the 
inmates at all times). Ganascia explores the consequences of this emerging paradigm in 
terms of power and democracy.  
This post-Foucaldian analysis is illustrated by a series of recent societal cases, and, 
among other seminal thoughts, shows how this Catopticon, on one hand, gives increased 
power and agency to single individuals (for example, a single individual can victoriously fight 
a powerful corporation) and, simultaneously, captures them all in the pervasive control 
system of a net which never forgets. In describing the emergence of this new power entity, 
which is distributed, overwhelming and uncontrollable, Ganascia shows us that new issues 
are emerging, such as the desire for visibility in a world of information overload, the right of 
access to information, the construction of cognitive authority and new rules for the political 
game. 
 
As we can see from these very diverse papers, new societal questions are emerging with the 
changes introduced by these new technologies. Some of these questions would have not 
been imaginable twenty years ago, and this is a sign that a change of paradigm is taking 
place, prompted by new techniques of capture and transfer, which are changing the contents 
and formats of relations between humans, which are the very fabric of our societies. 
 
3 Transmitting human experience 
 
Human experience is difficult to capture and transmit because it is multimodal, embodied and 
situated, passive and active; because sense making is subjective; because action is 
distributed; because observation may modify behaviour. 
 
If the hypothesis that we ventured in Section 1 (‘we wish to share experience more than we 
want to transmit knowledge’) is correct, the future will see an increased demand, and offer, to 
share human experience by means of digital technologies. 
In this context, there arise the questions of what exactly is human experience and 
how it can best be transmitted. Progress on these questions may help individuals capture 
and transmit their own experience. It may also help systems designers, industry, policy 
makers and (let’s face it) business. It is precisely for this last reason that we should be aware 
of what is intimate and must be preserved in this transmission, and as soon as possible set 
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some ethical principles before a technological fait accompli presents us with almost 
irreversible situations (cf. Facebook and its privatisation of personal data of millions of youth 
who wanted to share their experience). 
‘What is human experience?’ This is a difficult question if it is not asked with a specific 
purpose. We decided to leave aside the difficult philosophical issues of phenomenology and 
relativism, to cautiously ignore post-modernist critical stance and to avoid getting into 
detailed ethnomethodological discussions. Our approach will instead be to explore how we 
can share this human experience in practice. In doing so, we will venture an imperfect model, 
which owes a lot to activity theory, distributed cognition and functionalist perspectives in 
anthropology; a model which we hope will fuel a constructive discussion among theorists and 
practitioners.  
Let us start by examining some characteristics of human experience and how these 
impact the issue of capture and transmission. 
 
3.1 Human experience is multimodal and situated 
 
Human experience is multimodal because we exist on several levels simultaneously. The 
most obvious factor of multimodality is the diversity of our sensory organs: we see, hear, 
taste, smell, touch and act. In fact, talking about five senses is a strong reduction. 
Kinaesthesia involves all muscles. We see, hear, and smell in stereo. Taste involves several 
receptor systems. A more detailed analysis shows that we are constantly aware, at some 
level, of a considerable array of variables, from temperature to muscle tension and hormone 
levels. And of course, we have a mental and emotional life. All these parameters participate 
in our experience of the life-world; they contribute to explain why we behave as we do and 
how we make sense of situations. And these different types of input are irretrievably 
integrated into one single multimodal experience in the mind: mono-modal aspects cannot 
be, even at the neurone level, separated from this holistic experience. This is why, for 
example, a white wine coloured with a red (and otherwise neutral and tasteless) colouring 
will ‘taste’ like a red wine (Brochet, 2000). 
Because perceptions are embodied, experience is situated: we live it from our point of 
view in space and time and in our lived body. Only recently (Suchman, 1987) has science 
realized the implications for our cognition of the fact that we must in practice, continuously 
react on the fly, as we are carried along by the flow of events; in contrast to the distantiated 
and un-involved theoretical perspective. If we want to understand experience, we must seize 
it ‘in the wild’ (Hutchins, 1995a), in the flow of life, and not by a mere account ex-post facto, 
which, as we know, is a reconstruction, as are theories based on introspection alone. It is the 
difference between practice and theory.  
This calls for a capture of experience in situ: from the perspective of the actor, in its 
very body. This is easier said than done. For example, as we discovered through experiment, 
filming from the exact perspective of the retina produces a different effect than from, e.g. a 
camera attached to the forehead. The latter provides the perspective of someone slightly 
taller, and does not match with the subject’s own perception. Alignments and occlusions are 
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not rendered correctly, neither is eye contact; and the respective height of subjects, which is 
an important factor in interpersonal relations, is lost. 
And of course, situated means both in place and time. This means that experience 
must be recorded as it emerges on the fly. As a consequence, the decision to wear a capture 
device must be made in advance of the event to be observed. 
 
3.2 Human experience is both passion and action 
 
Strangely enough, philosophy has focused mainly on experience as a passion with the 
description of perception and emotions; but its motor aspect (action) is just as important. 
First, even perception is an activity because it results from an exploratory action with the 
sensory organs ( Gibson, 1963; Leont'ev, 1976; Lenay, 2008). Attention is the behaviour by 
which we orient our sensory systems to the environment; in doing so, we select some 
specific aspects and scotomize the rest. Many psychological experiments on the ‘priming’ 
effect, where the attention of the subject is selectively tuned to some aspects by providing 
her some cues prior to the stimuli, show how powerful this selection is. One can be in a 
situation and remain completely unaware of the aspects to which one is not ‘paying 
attention’. This phenomenon, called ‘inattentional blindness’ (Mack & Rock, 1988), has led to 
many a spectacular experiment of which the most famous is probably the ‘gorilla’ experiment 
(Simons & Chabris, 1999), in which subjects are shown a video of two basketball teams (one 
dressed in black, the other in white) and asked to count the number of times the white team 
passes the ball. In the middle of the film, a man dressed in a black gorilla suit slowly passes 
through the group and waves at the camera; but half of the subjects do not notice this when 
they see the film. When watching a second time after being warned about the gorilla, they all 
notice it and can hardly believe it is the same film they already saw. 
While the orientation of sensing in a specific direction is fairly easy to render with 
mechanical sensors (e.g. directional microphones), it is less easy to render the interpretive 
selection mechanism operated by the mind on the raw data (e.g. the capacity to tune in to a 
specific conversation in the noisy environment of a cocktail party). The only access we can 
have at this point seems to be to ask the subjects what their interpretations were.  
 
3.3 Sense making 
 
There is no perception per se, we always perceive ‘something’, that is, an object. What we 
experience are objects, intentions, situations, and not a series of perceptions. Therefore, 
simply capturing a flow of physical parameters will not be appropriate; we must capture the 
meaning of the experience. And to be understood, this meaning must find anchoring 
(Moscovici, 1961) in the representations of the receiver. Therefore, in this case more than 
ever, we should apply the postulate of adequacy: 
 
Postulate of adequacy. It may be formulated as follows: each term used in a 
scientific system referring to human action must be so constructed that a human act 
performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the 
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typical construction would be reasonable and understandable himself as well as for 
his fellow man. (Schütz, 1976: 19) 
 
3.4 Action is distributed 
 
Human action is distributed. For example, in a scene happening in a restaurant, many local 
actions are relevant: what happens at the tables, but also what the waiters are doing in the 
dining room, what they are doing backstage, and what the cooks are doing because all these 
are connected in a functional chain. And indeed each stake-holder to some extent takes into 
account what the others are doing in order to act properly. Therefore, a full explanation for 
the sake of education or transmission should provide the whole picture, and the way to 
construct the whole picture in a methodical and systematic way is the job of the scientist, 
who should not only rely on what his informers tell him.  
 
We would certainly be surprised if we found a cartographer in mapping a town 
restricting himself to collecting information from the natives. Nevertheless, social 
scientists frequently choose this strange method. They forget that their scientific work 
is done on a level of representation and understanding different from the people in 
daily life. (Schütz, 1942: 67) 
 
A representation of the whole situation, as the state of things and beings that 
surround us, is necessary to understand what was at stake in the experience that is being 
transmitted. While Schütz (Schütz, 1942) is quite right that the scientist should not limit 
herself to what the subject says, this part is still essential to understand what is at stake, and 
what are the values of the stakes; and in fact later in the same paper, Schütz writes, 
commenting on the example of a businessman who runs to catch the same train he takes 
every morning, in order, this specific day, not to loose an important contract: ‘Let us assume 
that an observer watches this man rushing for the train “as usual” (so he thinks). Is this 
behaviour planned, and if so, what is the plan? Only the actor can give the answer because 
he alone knows the span of his plans and projects’ (ibid.: 76). 
Indeed the actual components of the activity may not be obvious for an external 
observer. Sometimes the operator will use a proxy to evaluate the situation of an invisible 
element, e.g. the wheels of a vehicle: in the Pantanal (a wetland region in Mato Grosso) our 
guide Douglas Trent, as he drove his Volkswagen minibus over approximate bridges made of 
a couple of raw tree trunks, used to say (once the bridge was crossed) with the smile of the 
successful expert: ‘It’s good to know where your wheels are!’ How could we transfer his 
actual experience of crossing a bridge without accessing his internal representation of the 
situation and how risky he felt it was, knowing what he knew about bridges, wheels, 
minibuses, crocodiles and piranhas? 
This is why the description may need to go beyond a mere film of what a given 
subject ‘sees’. As we said, the subject’s attention focuses on specific aspects of the situation. 
But this does not preclude the subject’s taking into account other aspects of the situation. 
The aircraft pilot is aware of the position of the undercarriage; the train driver is aware of his 
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passengers --- even though he does not see them; and in fact these are important elements 
in their decisions. 
We believe that this context as viewed by the subject should be described in a ‘naive 
realistic’ manner. First, even if every experience is subjective and situated, common sense 
assumes realism: the subject believes that the context is ‘out there’. Therefore, for the sake 
of communication in practice, we shall do ‘as if’ it was indeed ‘out there’, and provide an 
‘objective’ description of the scene, sticking to common sense..  This is not always satisfying 
in theory, but is handy in practice. [2]. 
 
3.5 Observation may modify behaviour 
 
If the subject is aware of being observed, observation may modify the behaviour. This is 
especially obvious when the observer is present in situations where private interactions take 
place. 
When observed, subjects tend to stick to the rules of the group. In fact, what matters 
is less the presence of the observer herself than the group she represents. This is why it is 
still possible to get good observations when the subject is promised confidentiality (‘only the 
observer will know’). If the subject does not fear being seen misbehaving by the members of 
his in-group (e.g. the viewers are from another group; or the subject thinks his behaviour is 
acceptable, or has a status such that it does not matter, etc.), then the effect of observation 
is minor. 
There are also possible implications of the fact that the subject knows that his 
behaviour will be traced by automatic instruments. Nosulenko, Pavard, Rognin, & 
Samoylenko (1993) provide an interesting example of such a case, in which operators in a 
space-mission control centre had to go away from the official –and traced- communication 
system to solve a problem in an unconventional manner, and then denied having done so.  
Finally, as observation is also the result of attentional focus, the way the recording is 
done by the observer may modify the representation of behaviour. Depending on the camera 
angle or when the film starts, interpretation can be completely reversed. For example, during 
our conversations about activity recording with British police, one stated that one time his 
attempt to help a very agitated drunk person was mistaken for an aggression, based on a 
video-tape made by a witness; hence he was put into serious trouble. Fortunately a video-
camera on a pole had captured the whole scene from the beginning and from another angle, 
which enabled him to prove that the witness’s interpretation was wrong, and saved the 
policeman’s day. 
More generally, observers from outside the community tend to have an ignorance 
bias and fail to capture elements that are critical to understanding the situation, while inside 
observers tend to ignore element that are inconsistent with the image they want to have of 
their community (Cicourel & Lahlou, 2005). 
 
As we see, human experience is a complex phenomenon to capture, and to transfer. There 
are still more issues in capturing and transferring human experience: some crucial elements 
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are tacit, holographic (distributed in communities) and transient: Garcia-Lorenzo addresses 
some of these problems in her paper in this issue. 
Nevertheless, even if it seems very difficult to capture and transfer human experience 
in theory, we manage to do it in practice on an everyday basis. And digitization will now 
enable us to solve some of these issues and make the process easier, as we shall see in the 
next section. 
 
4 Digital technologies, capture and transmission 
 
Digital technologies, and especially digital video, have already brought considerable changes 
in the social sciences. The use of image had brought a first revolution in qualitative research 
by providing a whole set of new investigation techniques (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000). The 
technological progress of digital video, streaming, automatic indexing, online editing and 
analysis, and computer-supported collaborative work have taken it a step further (Pea,1994, 
Pea 2006; Cordelois, 2010). 
Digital ethnography enables both better study of ‘classic’ interaction and study of IT-
augmented environments (Hollan & Hutchins, 2009). This is welcome, since, because of the 
‘digital projection’ (Lahlou, 2008a) of activity, many of the new interactions are happening in 
digital space (e.g. on the computer screen), where classic observation systems could hardly 
follow. As we said earlier, digitization brings new affordances and relaxes some constraints. 
 
4.1 Digitization relaxes some constraints 
 
As Pink points out:  
 
Recently, uses of video in ethnographic research have developed in tandem 
with new technologies, innovations and theoretical perspectives. Shifts from a realist 
approach to video as ‘objective’ reality to the idea of video as representation shaped 
by specific standpoints of its producers and viewers have encouraged the 
development of collaborative approaches to the production and interpretation of video 
images. The introduction of digital video and computer-based techniques seems 
particularly appropriate for the development of these methods and is forming the 
basis of future development in video research. (Pink, 2007: 116) 
 
Situated and multimodal capture has now become possible. Wearable sensors can 
capture most of the biological parameters of the human body. Unfortunately, for most of them 
the replay does not re-present the experience adequately: seeing electric signals of blood 
pressure or brain scans does not enable us to re-live something of the experience. This is a 
problem of representation format. But at least for image and sound, and also to some degree 
for haptics and smell, we have found ways of re-presenting the experience: when we see 
films, they make sense and we can understand the situation. This is a direction for research, 
and some amazing results lead us to expect future progress in multimodality replay, since 
subjects can learn to use other neural pathways to the brain for the input of sensory 
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information (Bach-y-Rita et al., 2005). But at least for the time being, we can rely on video-
cameras and audio.  
Especially interesting is the possibility of getting a ‘subjective’ recording of activity. To 
understand the nature of situated cognition and activity, Lahlou set up in 1998 a method to 
capture a situated first-person audio-visual recording (‘subfilm’), using the Subcam --- a 
miniature video-camera with wide-angle worn at eye level --- and the interpretation by the 
subject itself of the films (especially the goals and emotions), obtained by asking the subject 
to comment their own subfilms (Lahlou 2006, 2009; Le Bellu, Lahlou & Le Blanc, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 1 : A frame extracted from a subfilm (filmed with a Subcam)  
 
Unobtrusive, wearable sensors. Using wearables, as the subject becomes her/his 
own observer, partly solves the problem of modification of behaviour by the observation. The 
subject feels like an observer as well as an ‘observed’. This seems to make the subject feel 
more in control of her data, especially if, as we do in our protocols (Lahlou, 2006), the subject 
sees the data first and only hands them over to the researcher if (s)he is satisfied with their 
content. 
A subject recording her/his own experience with the Subcam is called a ‘subcamer’. 
The resulting ‘subfilms’ can be used for research, and be shown to others, enabling them to 
share the subjective experience of the subcamer as passengers in her/his head (Figure 1). 
Because the Subcam has a wide angle, it captures not only what the subject sees but also 
what s(he) does, at least with the hands; and what s(he) hears and says. We therefore 
capture a good view of the action itself, from a first-person perspective, with the correct eye--
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hand synchronisation. Since the subject tends systematically to look at what (s)he is doing, 
the Subcam enables us, and this is not trivial, to capture the focus of attention.  
Interestingly, as viewers are taken into the perception--action loop of the subcamer 
(‘entheasy’: sharing the contemplation of action), an identification process emerges and 
empathy occurs, based on sharing similar phenomenological experience. Although we do not 
get a fully multimodal recording, because experience is united in a single bundle, it seems 
that the elements recorded on tape are enough to elicit in the viewer an experience similar to 
the subject’s. To what degree this is deceptive is difficult to know: in theory, this facilitated 
reconstruction effect is a double-edged sword, since my reconstructed experience of e.g. 
driving a car or eating macaroni will be phenomenologically different from yours, as they are 
the result of each of our total life-experiences. Once again, theory and practice diverge here. 
Experience shows that entheasy is quite different from empathy. As viewers, we precisely 
feel the small differences in the way the subcamer does things ‘differently’. In fact, we get a 
feeling of detachment even when watching our own tapes. The result is an awareness of 
what the subcamer is doing (because we identify immediately the typified situations, and 
correctly infer typified goals), but there is still a feeling of strangeness. More research on this 
phenomenon is needed. 
Moreover, confronted with their own subfilms, subcamers themselves show a 
remarkable capacity for remembering their actual mental states during activity (emotions, 
goals) (Lahlou, 2006). As they are re-immersed in the past episode with the same 
perspective from which they lived it, they gain direct access to their ‘episodic memory’ 
(Tulving, 1972, 2002). This is one of the most important features of our subjective recording 
methodology because it yields access to the cognitive aspects of activity. 
The fact that reviewing images of the day is a powerful memory aid has been used by 
Steve Hodge and his colleagues: their SenseCam (Hodges et al., 2006) helps Alzheimer 
patients to remember their day and share memories with their partner.  
Another line of development of wearables, pioneered by Steve Mann, is the 
continuous recording of one’s own history with wearable cameras, to ‘help us remember and 
see better, provide us with personal safety through crime reduction, and facilitate new forms 
of communication through collective connected humanistic intelligence’ (Mann, 1998). This 
has also led to a democratic project to combat surveillance by keeping records of one’s own 
perspective and therefore being able to oppose this individual perspective to the surveillance 
recordings: Mann coined the term ‘sousveillance’ for this inverse form of surveillance (Mann, 
2004).  
Sensors in the context, for example passive sensors at doors, access log-ins, and 
more generally any system keeping a trace of the subject’s activity, as in the ‘disappearing 
computing’ systems which will be embedded in most home and office automation systems 
(Streitz et al., 2007), can contribute to creating a ‘lifelog’ that is a continuous trace of what 
the subject does (Gemmell et al., 2002). On one hand, this answers the issue of distributed 
activity (Section 0). But on the other hand, lifelogging, because it can be done without the 
observed subject’s awareness, can cause massive privacy problems (Lahlou, 2008b).  
In sum, wearables and distributed sensors provide silent, unobtrusive and continuous 
observation. Situated recordings enable explicitation of the mental states accompanying 
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activity by using self-confrontation of the subjects with the data. These techniques are 
employed by other authors in this issue (Le Bellu, Lahlou et Le Blanc, 2009; Cordelois, 
2010). Unless they are used with the informed consent of the subjects, however, such 
techniques carry risks for privacy and freedom of action. Nevertheless, the Subcam and 
similar techniques of subjective recording open unprecedented access to human experience 
and insight into mental states. Not only can we get a realistic visual and auditory account of 
the situated individual experience of the Other, but also we can get detailed comments ‘from 
the horse’s mouth’ on how this Other interpreted the events, what emotions were felt and 
what were the intentions behind the actions. The SHEOS project underway at the Institute of 
Social Psychology at the London School of Economics and Political Science is a global 
attempt to use these techniques to constitute a historical compendium of human experience 
for research purposes (SHEOS, 2010). 
As such systematic transmission projects grow, it will become necessary to formulate 
some guidelines for the formats in which to capture human experience. 
 
 5 A new model for the description of human experience: ‘transition’ trajectories. 
 
In the present issue, Lucia Garcia-Lorenzo gives an account of the history of stories and how 
they can be used in practice. Stories (or narratives) have always been a privileged mode of 
transmission of human experience. And this may be why all humans like stories, from their 
youngest age.  
But why are narratives a privileged form of transmission of experience? Because from 
the perspective of the subject, the World appears continuously in the form of a ‘story’ of 
which the subject is the hero, in which the (s)he moves, acts, and meets objects and 
characters. This story is necessarily experienced in the form of temporal succession, and is 
focused on the conduct of the course of a single hero (the subject,) who imposes his vantage 
point. In other words, narration is not a specific mode of description, it is the archetypal mode 
of a subject’s experience of the world. We tend to identify with the hero of the story because 
in our real-life story we are always the hero. 
The narrative categories of temporal succession, places, scenes, characters, etc. 
correspond to the naive categories that the common man uses to describe the states of 
things in his subjective experience. It is not surprising that the theatrical metaphor used by 
Goffman works so well for describing everyday life (Goffman, 1959): the very narrative 
structure of drama is based on the categories by which humans make sense of their life. 
Narratives are very powerful because they typify the story. The use of language, 
which is ‘the medium of typification par excellence’ (Schütz, 1951), ensures that listeners will 
be able to interpret what the narrative is about. When we say ‘Albert sat on a chair and took 
his hammer’; the words ‘chair’, ‘hammer’, as well as the use of the verb ‘to sit’, refer to 
typified elements of activity that we can readily understand. Whereas getting, for example, 
Albert’s brain electric signals, as captured by brain electrodes, would mean nothing to us. In 
other words, the narrative applies Schütz’s postulate of adequacy (cf. above, 3.3). 
The classic narrative created a ’narrative world’ (Eco, 1979), made of typifications 
(objects, characters, props, etc.), where the hero would progress in a succession of actions 
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and solve problems within the framework of this narrative world in accordance with his 
motives. Therefore we, as spectators, would understand what happened by identifying with 
the hero. 
Classic narratives were a great solution when direct, situated, subjective recording of 
experience was not available. Now that we have this new possibility, can we imagine a better 
format for the transfer of experience? This is what the following section attempts to do. 
 
5.1 A systemic description of activity 
 
Human experience is about experience of activity, so we need to describe activity. Activity is about 
transition between successive states of the life-world. 
Dynamical-systems formalism is relevant for our problem because it provides a clean 
description of successive states of complex  system. A dynamical system is a model to describe the 
evolution over time of a set of interacting objects, with the following conventions (Katok & 
Hasselblatt 1996; Daucé 2010):  
--- A representation of state, which is, for each state of the system, the list of the m values of 
variables describing this given state. The space of all possible states is a manifold M of dimension m, 
called ‘phase space’. One specific state is represented as a point x = (a1, a2, … am) of this space.  
--- A transition function F, which defines the state of the system at a given moment of time, 
from its states in the previous times. If the system is initially at a state x, it will find itself after time t 
at a new state F(x, t). This function verifies: F(x, 0) = x and F(F(x, t1), t2) = F(x, t1 + t2). 
The transition function can therefore describe the trajectory of the system in the phase space.  
More precisely, the trajectory that has x0 for origin (x0 describes the initial conditions) will be 
defined by the application 
Fx0: T  M such that Fx0(t) = F(x0 , t).  
This associates a specific state of the system with each point in time. This function can be 
represented by a curve in the phase space, the trajectory formed by the points representing the 
successive state of the system, F(x0 , t) as t varies. 
These ‘states’ are constituents of activity in activity theory. A ‘represented final state of the 
system’ is a ‘goal’. At any moment, the state of the system is ‘the conditions given’, which are the 
context in which the subject will try to achieve the goal. Therefore, trajectories in a phase space would 
map the actions (transition from one step to the next) or, rather, the results of actions as a modification 
of the state of the environment (external and internal). 
In theory, a dynamical system is a very generic formalism that could describe any 
complex system, including the ones in which human experience takes place. In practice, in 
the current state of the art, we are only able to describe rather simple and limited systems of 
the real world, with a restricted number of variables (usually a few hundreds at most) 
connected by relatively straightforward relations (e.g. positive or negative feedback, etc.). 
This is too limited to describe the behaviour of an individual human in an open environment. 
Nevertheless, the basic principles of representation of dynamical systems can be used 
metaphorically to explain the subjects that an activity can be considered as “a trajectory in a 
state space”, and therefore provide them with some guidelines as how to describe it. The 
interest of such an approach is that we ask the subject to describe his activity not simply as a 
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sequence of his own actions and decisions but as the sequence of successive situations 
experienced in the course of activity. This elicits descriptions that can be used by others to 
diagnose the situations and interpret them in terms of what can/should be done: their activity 
connotations (Von Uexküll, 1965). This is part of a functionalist approach to the transfer of 
human experience. Furthermore, such descriptions of situations facilitate the cognitive 
process of comparison (of situations). The cognitive mechanism of comparison is at the basis 
of the perceived-quality method (Nosulenko & Samoylenko, 2009) used to design operational 
changes based on user experience. 
Put simply, without the mathematical apparatus: in a dynamical system, a state of the 
system is represented by a point in the mathematical space of all possible states; therefore 
an activity can be represented by a trajectory in this space. The trajectory starts with the 
initial situation. The subject in the initial situation has a goal, which is to find herself in 
another situation, hopefully the final state of the trajectory. Some points are intermediate 
goals, which the subjects anticipate as action steps in their activity trajectory.  
Once this is understood, the subject should be able to describe the activity as 
anticipated (‘thinking in the future perfect tense’, to use Schütz’s expression), even before 
starting it. Since a goal is ‘a conscious description of this state to be reached’, the subject is 
usually able to describe it, as well as the intermediate goals that are reached by action steps. 
For example, if the initial situation is realizing that one has a flat tire while driving, a 
first action step might be to find a safe place to stop (sub-goal: ‘park in a safe place’). Then 
another step will be to take off the wheel with the flat tire; another one to put on the spare 
wheel; another to get the flat tire repaired; etc. 
Subjects will usually understand rather easily this idea of behavioural trajectory. 
When asked to describe their own trajectory and the ‘action steps’ they take, the idea of a 
trajectory will help them make their goals and decision points explicit (although they may 
tend to overemphasize the spatial aspect because of the trajectory metaphor).  
Subjects can also be asked to describe the alternative trajectories that may be 
considered at decision steps. For example, once safely parked, the subject may consider 
changing the tire herself, call the insurance to send someone to do it or use instant tire 
sealant.  
When the whole activity is developed, the result is some sort of tree of possible 
trajectories. It must be made quite clear that this tree does not necessarily exist ex ante; it 
develops as the subject progresses in the activity, and the alternatives, as well as their 
characteristics, unfold from what the subject finds in the situation itself. Experience shows 
that what happens is that the subject tends to follow routines, and only when the routine does 
not work as expected is the subject’s awareness awakened and directed at the problem. In 
these moments, the subject tries to make sense of the situation, and the goal is often to find 
an alternative path to reach the initial goal. Figure 2 shows an example with the “flat tire”, 
where a subject describes his story as a series of successive state (we took an example 
without video to make the discussion shorter).  
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A – Driving normally on the highway  
B – Strange vibration in the steering wheel, car unstable, noise. Awareness that 
something is wrong.  
B1. Hypothesis : road is damaged : visibly no  
B2 Hypothesis : car is damaged (flat tire?) [alternative chosen]  
C- Decision :  
C1. continue driving (dangerous?)  
C2. Stop immediately (dangerous if no parking space)  
C3. Slow down and park as soon as safe place is available [alternative chosen]  
D – Slow down and stop in rest area  
E. Get out of car and check. Diagnosis : ‘Flat tire’  
 – Decision :  
 E1. Fix tire with spare tire (big hassle: dirty, tiring, causes delay)  
 E2. Call insurance to send mechanic to change tire (unknown delay and cost)  
E3. Fix tire with instant sealant (easy, fast, but damages tire and only transient 
solution) [alternative chosen/ done].  
F. Drive slowly for 10 miles  
G. Get to initial destination, but note that soon must go to garage to fix tire  
Figure 2. The flat tire. Example of an activity trajectory described by steps, as a tree 
of possibilities (first and second level of branches only detailed).  
 
Some of these trajectories lead into hazardous or unpleasant state zones, which the 
subject may be able to describe as state areas to avoid. For example, changing a tire on the 
side of a highway when the tire to be changed is on the highway side is a dangerous state 
area to be in. 
The subject then can be asked to describe each sub-goal state as ‘a situation’, as if 
the subject ‘was there’ and was looking ‘around and inside herself 360°’ to describe the state 
of the various objects, and what affordances or risk may exist at this point. This is a 
subjective interpretation of the situation.  
“This world, built around my own I, presents itself for interpretation to me, being living 
naïvely within it. From this standpoint everything has reference to my actual historical 
situation, or as we can also say, to my pragmatic interests which belong to the situation in 
which I find myself here and now” (Schütz, [1954], 1962 p. 134)  
For example, in our ‘flat tire’ scenario, the situation when one is changing the tire on 
the road-side, with the cars passing just behind one, is indeed very uncomfortable. The 360° 
description of the situation will include both the aspects of the context (wearing the ‘high viz’ 
bright reflective jacket, park as far as possible off the road, etc.) and the internal goals (e.g. 
do things fast but methodically because the worst is to have to start over again; ask the 
children to leave the car and sit in a safe place, don’t let the bolts roll under the car or onto 
the road etc.); but also the emotions (fear, frustration, determination etc.). 
This technique of transmission of human experience, of course, can be applied purely 
verbally, as just shown, but we propose to use it in conjunction with a subjective recording 
methodology, like the Subcam protocol, in order to gather the cognitive elements needed to 
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understand the activity. The first step is to ask the subject to describe the activity, without 
looking at the film (step 1 below). This will train the subject to pay introspective attention to 
action steps and goals, and produce a tree of activity as in Figure 2.  
Step 2 is to look at the film with the subject, and ask him to ‘pause’ the film [1] each 
time he wants to comment, and then to describe the elements of activity (objects, people, 
goals, feelings…) with the 360° exercise. This produces a series of commented clips, like the 
ones described by (Cordelois, 2010) or (Le Bellu et al., 2010). The format depends on the 
video software used. Figure 3 shows an extract of such analysis on a subfilm of a driver 
entering an underground parking lot, using the Diver software (Pea 2006). In this analysis, 
only the trajectory of the succession of the actual situations is shown, since the possible 
alternatives that were not chosen, of course, did not materialize.  
 
 
Figure 3: Example of analysis taken from step 2 using the Diver software  
 
Comparison between the two steps, which will often be spontaneously done by the 
subject, is revealing of many important details or process. Here is an example of how to 
introduce verbally the subject to the exercise. 
 
Phase 1: verbal description without self-confrontation with the film 
I will ask you to describe your activity as a journey through different phases, just as 
you would describe a trajectory on a map. Think of the initial point as the situation where you 
start from, and as the end point of a situation at which you want to arrive (your goal).  
We speak in terms of changes of situation; this does not mean that you move in 
geographical space, but rather in the space of situations. Can you describe the situation you 
want to reach --- your goal? To describe it, imagine yourself there: look around and inside 
yourself 360°, and describe what there is (what should be there). 
Can you do the same for the situation you started from? 
Now let us consider your journey step by step. What are the important action steps 
and the intermediate states you want to reach?  
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For each of them, explain if this is a decision-making point and what the alternatives 
are.  
 
Phase 2: verbal comment of the film during self-confrontation 
Please comment on the video as it plays; do not hesitate to pause when you wish to 
give a detailed explanation. Please also pause at each important step or decision-making 
moment to explain what your thoughts were at that moment and what were the important 
aspects in the situation. Use with the 360° look-around-and-inside method. 
It is very important that these exchanges have some obschenie aspect: the subject 
should have a clear social motivation for explicating his activity and experience. If the subject 
is providing his description for a group he likes, then sharing will be a pleasure. The 
interviewer should therefore in some way represent or impersonate a community of liked 
recipients.  
When the dynamical-system approach can be used more fully to draw some phase 
space this can provide great insight. It is difficult to get more than very crude 2-dimensional 
maps of such phase spaces, but even these can prove useful for exploring the psychological 
experience and the rationale of decision-making. Figure 4 shows such a crude 2-dimensional 
map, resulting from a discussion and several scribble attempts at drafting the domains the 
subject tried to avoid during the flat-tire experience described in Figure 2 (see explanation 
below). Note that this phase space did not exist as a mental representation before the 
explicitation exercise, and is instead a result of it. Still, it is interesting, and the subject can 
comment on some of its dimensions, e.g. here the fact that on the left side the ‘upset’ feeling 
grows, while to the right the ‘scared’ feeling grows; and that the ‘lower’ zones are more 
stressful than the ‘upper’ ones. Such maps can be used to position other events (e.g. here: ‘a 
collision’ in the BIG DANGER zone; ‘a major mechanical breakdown’, like the gear box, in 
the BIG HASSLE zone). It can also help subjects verbalize their feelings. Interestingly, the 
feelings can be attributed to the whole situation, and not to the subject’s own body. For 
example, in case of mechanical damage to their car (with no human physically harmed), 
some subjects still express the idea that it (the damage to the car) hurts them in their own 
body. 
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Figure 4: A crude phase space constructed around the ‘flat tire’ experience. The trajectory of 
experience (fat curve) and its steps refer back to the indexing of steps in Figure 2. 
 
The phase space distinguishes the normal state of driving without incident, which is 
the staring state (ALL OK), step A.  
Then, with the awareness of a strange noise and vibration, the subject reaches a 
zone of NOT OK. This is where step B (strange vibration in the steering wheel, car unstable, 
noise. Awareness that something is wrong) occurs.  
Then the subject moves on to step C, which is a decision-making point (continue 
driving fast/ Stop immediately/ Slow down and park as soon as safe place is available). The 
first two options would lead into a HIGH DANGER zone, and the subject chooses the third 
(slow down until safe parking available), which moves the situation into a SMALL DANGER 
zone. Step D (slow down and stop in rest area) is on the border between SMALL DANGER 
and a new zone, SMALL HASSLE.  
As the subject goes around the car and diagnoses the flat tire, he moves to E, which 
is a decision step (between E1. Fix tire with spare / E2. Call insurance to send mechanic to 
change tire / E3. Fix tire with instant sealant). 
E is on the border between SMALL HASSLE and BIG HASSLE, because E1 is a big 
hassle (dirty, effortful and delaying); E3 is a small hassle (easy, fast, but damages tire and 
only transient solution), and E2 is borderline because the consequences are unknown (small 
or big hassle?). 
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As subject chooses E3, fixes the tire and restarts driving (slowlyat first  to let the 
sealant dry evenly) he transits slowly through the SMALL HASSLE zone and finally, as he 
resumes driving at normal speed, goes back into the NOT OK zone, where something is 
wrong but where the solution is still acceptable: waiting for a definitive fix.  
The model is not perfect (why would state F and state B be in the same NOT OK 
zone? Should we not distinguish two different subzones? Etc. But it gives a different insight 
into the subject’s experience than the mere tree of Figure 2.  
Finally, the dynamical-systems approach is useful because it enables us to describe a 
phenomenon we frequently observe: in some areas of the phase space, the subjects tend to 
get captured by ‘cognitive attractors’, that is the automatically, and almost against their will, 
get sidetracked into performing some other activity. A typical instance of this is ‘doing email’: 
when  the subject opens her mailbox for a specific reason, she will tend to do a complete 
processing of all new emails. It seems that ‘the situation has a momentum of its own’. These 
phenomena, which have been described elsewhere (Lahlou, 2000, 2009), are frequent to the 
point  that we suspect a large part of ordinary activity is simply chaining execution of such 
‘attractors’ as the subjects get into the situations proposed by their environment. Technically, 
in dynamical-systems formalism, an attractor is a compact set of the phase space, into which 
all nearby trajectories converge. The basin of attraction is the set of points whose trajectories 
converge to the attractor: in other words, a basin of attraction is a set of initial conditions that 
lead towards this attractor. When the phase space contains several attractors, each attractor 
has its own ‘basin of attraction’. The separating varieties that mark the border between two 
basins are places of bifurcation, where the system can switch from one attractor to another. 
The intuition behind the use of activity phase space as a metaphor to describe human 
experience is therefore very similar to the one that was at the basis of Kurt Lewin’s dynamic 
psychology, and more particularly his field theory (Lewin, 1951), where the behaviour 
depends on the position of the individual in a life-world, characterized by force fields 
(although Lewin used different mathematical conventions, based on the physics of his time). 
In practice, as we said, it is difficult to describe in a comprehensive way the phase 
space corresponding to the behaviour of a subject. So the concept of attractor, for example, 
will likely wait several decades before we can make quantified applications; nevertheless it 
remains usable in principle. An activity is a path in the lived world, a phenomenological 
tunnel of perception-action. It unfolds in time. At a given moment, it corresponds to a certain 
arrangement of objects around it and to the internal conditions of the subject (e.g. ‘sitting at 
my computer, typing on the keyboard with my email open). When the subject is cruising her 
phase space, if her trajectory accidentally or deliberately crosses a basin of attraction, this 
action will tend to be executed. E.g. ‘sitting at my computer, typing on my keyboard with 
email open’ will most probably trigger an email session. As subjects are to some extent 
aware of this phenomenon, and of the ‘autonomous momentum’ that certain zones of the 
phase space carry, they can label these zones in terms of activity and of what states they will 
probably lead into (e.g. danger zones, etc.).  
Once again, it is the job of the interviewer top make this latent knowledge that the 
subjects have of their life-word and own experience made explicit in the interview.  
 
24 
As the reader can see, our approach is very open and flexible. We suggest adapting it 
to the situation at hand. The important elements are to collect the goals, decision-making 
processes and other mental psychological aspects of activity, in order to give as an account 
of experience complete as possible. The trajectory metaphor is used loosely to help the 
subjects structure their explicitation both hierarchically and sequentially, that is along the two 
main dimensions of the organization of goal-directed activity (Cranach, Mächler & Steiner, 
1985). The spatial metaphor also helps the subject to highlight as stages the loci of possible 
bifurcation, which are usually the most interesting moments.  
Given that this explicitation takes the form of a semi-directive interview, it is not so 
important that the subject himself does or does not fully understand what a dynamical system 
is, and what “activity theory” is --- as long as the researcher who conducts the explicitation 
does. If this is the case, the researcher will know what kind of explicitation she needs from 
the subject, and adapt accordingly. 
 
5.2 Limitations 
 
At this point, one may wonder why we are using such a vague and flexible protocol for data 
collection. The sad truth is that, in the current state of the art, we (at least our group) know 
too little to be able to recommend very precise guidelines, since the situations of data 
collection are complex, and one-size-fits-all methodology does not seem commendable. 
Behind this is a problem of fuzziness at the theoretical level: human experience is a 
complex phenomenon, as was shown in Section 2. Brilliant scholars have tackled the 
problem, following Husserl. Alfred Schütz wrote sharp and deep pages on this issue and 
made the effort to analyze the issue of mental planning and reconstruction of activity by the 
subject himself in the perspectives provided by Husserl, Dewey, Bergson and Leibniz 
(Schütz, 1951).While his discussion is fascinating, its practical implications for our purpose 
remain limited, since Schütz leaves the question somewhat open.  
In general, there seems to be a gap between theoretical discussions and practical 
applications to everyday research. Being very theoretical was also to some extent the 
problem for activity theory (Rubinstein, 1957; Leont'ev, 1978; Nosulenko & Rabardel, 2007), 
at least until recent developments in ‘perceived quality’ (Nosulenko, Parizet & Samoylenko, 
1998; Nosulenko & Samoylenko, 2001) proposed methodology which has passed the test of 
real-life applications.  
Because there is still discussion on the very nature of the cognitive correlates of 
behaviour, it is not surprising that the categories used to describe them in empirical research 
remain problematic. Let us take, for example, Von Cranach’s school of ‘goal-directed action’ 
theory (Ginsburg, Brenner, & Cranach, 1985), which is certainly one of the best attempts to 
tackle the issue with a clear formalism. But its tenants come up with so many theoretical 
dimensions and distinctions that the theory becomes hardly usable in practice. On the other 
hand, ‘simple’ theories do not pass the reality test.  
The renewal of activity theory (Engeström, 1990; Kaptelinin, Kuutti, & Bannon, 1995; 
Kuutti, 1996; Nardi, 1996) has brought progress in the theoretical aspects. There is a 
growing body of applied research that revolves around the issue of analysing activity, more 
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and more with the use of video. Each group tends to propose their own methodology, a sign 
of the domain’s methodological immaturity (see (Le Bellu et al., 2010; Sonntag et al., 2002) 
for reviews). But similarities emerge, which is all the more remarkable seeing that the authors 
start from very different theoretical perspectives.  
The general and indeed rather vague instructions proposed here are in the same vein 
of empowering the subject with some communication framework (narration, explanation to 
colleague, description for a novice, etc.) in order to facilitate the process of introspection and 
translation of personal experience into typified, understandable communication. For this, a 
format of social communication that makes sense for the subject is necessary. Therefore 
here, as in most techniques, communication combines the content and sharing 
(kommunikatsiya and obschenie) aspects by providing a partner and an audience in the 
person of the researcher and the community of friendly fellow men s(he) should impersonate. 
The description of experience for its transmission (typically: in a training process, from 
expert to novice) requires a description in a format that enables one to understand the nature 
of the activity. This means that the main components of activity as it is experienced and 
performed must be evidenced in the format: this includes not only the performed actions 
(motor movements, acts of thought) but also the goals, motives and rationales for strategies. 
This is what we tried to provide with our explicitation technique based on subjective 
recording. 
Activity theory teaches us that the behaviour we actually observe when a subject 
performs her task is not the activity itself but merely one possible path that was chosen in 
this specific situation to reach the goal in the conditions given. For example, when this 
subject takes a key and turns it clockwise four times to close the valve, the purpose of the 
activity is not to turn a key four times clockwise, but rather to regulate the flow so that it 
attains a desired value, which depends on the global situation of the system. Were the initial 
state of the system different, for the same purpose the subject might have to turn the key e.g. 
two times counter-clockwise. And in fact, the use of the key may be only an emergency 
procedure when the valve’s motor is not working. 
Therefore, what is important is to clarify the goal and the rationale for decision 
making; because these are what enable sense making of the subject’s experience by 
another subject, as well as a profitable transfer of that experience. What matters is not so 
much the exact protocol that is used, but the fact that in the end we manage to capture the 
goals and other psychological aspects of activity. If the subject can provide them easily, fine. 
If not, the researcher must be creative and adapt the interview strategy to the case at hand. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
Sharing human experience is essential for learning. It is also a crucial aspect of social life. 
The two aspects of communication (kommunikatsiya and obschenie) are always present 
together, and this must be kept in mind when considering the future impact of digital 
technologies.  
This impact will be massive, as with any technique that changes the system of 
representation of human experience. By forwarding the hypothesis that ‘we wish to share 
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experience more than we want to transmit knowledge’, we suggested that social media will in 
the future be used for experience sharing; to transfer more and more multimodal, intimate, 
aspects of individual experience; and to build communities, as the same time as they grow 
as communication systems.  
The articles collected in this issue show some directions in which this is beginning to 
happen, with new techniques and systems of capture and transfer; with the creation of new 
narrative formats; with institutional initiatives to control or create reasoned frameworks for 
this emerging flow. They point at both the human capacity to adapt to digital representations, 
and the dangers of a globally connected system where these representations flow in 
sometimes-unexpected ways. 
We proposed a format to describe human experience as a trajectory of transitions 
between states of the system. The format is based on the use of subjective recording of 
activity, enabled by digital technologies, and especially the Subcam. This recording is then 
explicated by the subject in a semi-directive process, which uses activity theory as a 
framework to structure the description of relevant elements. The protocol helps the subject to 
make his psychological processes explicit by proposing the description of activity as a step-
by-step trajectory, in a space of possible states, a technique loosely inspired by dynamical 
systems theory. This provides descriptions of the local processes of transition from one state 
to the next. The method is designed to be vague and flexible enough to be adapted to local 
cases: this weakness of the method is also what makes it robust. 
In the end, what matters is the transmission of experience from one human to 
another. The human (body and mind) is by design the best (and only) instrument that can 
decode and interpret human experience. Our efforts, as a species, and as researchers, are 
directed at finding the best proxies to transfer this experience from human body to human 
body. To the biological level of emotion decoding (which we share with social animals) 
human culture has added stories, using symbolic language and graphic representations. 
Now the art of narration will have at hand new powerful digital tools to transmit more aspects 
of human experience, and to transmit them on a large scale. This will augment the forms of 
connectedness and sharing. Whatever new forms of civilization emerge from this will 
certainly be interesting to watch. 
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Notes 
 
1. It is handy to use a system that enables each of the participants in the self-
confrontation (researcher, subject, and other subjects if this is collective) to pause 
easily the video. 
2. What we do here is very similar to the husserlian « phenomenological reduction » which 
enables to discuss the subjective experience while leaving aside the epistemic issues of 
realism and relativism. “The phenomenologist does not deny the existence of the outer 
world, but for his analytical purpose he makes up his mind to suspend belief in its 
existence –that is, to refrain intentionally and systematically from all judgements related 
directly or indirectly to the existence of the outer world. Borrowing from mathematical 
technique, Husserl called this procedure “putting the world in brackets” or “performing the 
phenomenological reduction”. There is nothing mysterious in these notions, which are 
merely names for the technical device of phenomenology for radicalizing the Cartesian 
method of philosophical doubt, in order to go beyond the natural attitude of man living 
within the world he accepts, be it reality or mere appearance.” (Schütz, [1944], 1962 p. 
104)  
3. “What remains after the performance of the transcendental reduction is nothing less than 
the universe of our conscious life, the stream of thought in its integrity, with all its activities 
and with all the cogitations and experiences (both terms being used in the broadest the 
Cartesian- sense, which also includes not only perceptions, conceptions, judgements, but 
also acts of will, feelings, dreams, fantasies etc.” (Schütz, [1944], 1962 p. 104) 
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